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Abstract 
Embodiment theories have overcome the doctrine of intellectus archetypus without 
ever discussing the notion of body on which that particular kind of intellect was 
based. Indeed, the model of the body underlying embodiment theories remains an 
a priori: anthropomorphic, independent and “self-contained”. This paper sheds 
light on the problematic points of this vision and explores the anthropology of 
the “ontological turn”, looking for alternative modes of body knowledge – seeing 
it as the result of “affects”, “affections” and habitus – more effective in justifying 
the corporeal dimension of cognition. 
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The theory of Embodiment or of the “Embodied Mind”, which locates 
cognition in the body and its sensorimotor processes (see Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch 1991, Lakoff and Johnson 1999), and its derived 
theory of the “Extended Mind”, which suggests that the environment 
and environmental interaction play a constitutive role in the for-
mation of cognitive processes (see Clark and Chalmers 1998, Clark 
2008, Wilson 2004), seriously challenged what Isabelle Stengers has 
called the greatest “division” in Western thought: the Cartesian dual-
ism between mind and body (see Stengers 1997). Both “Embodi-
ment” and “Extended Mind” theories criticize the ideal of an arche-
typal intellect (intellectus archetypus) that produces everything and in 
which everything is produced, and argue that cognitive and mental 
processes are expressed in the body (Embodiment) and in the envi-
ronment (Extended Mind). 
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Despite the optimistic reductionism of neuroscientists, over the 
past thirty years this conception has achieved a certain consensus. 
And yet, although ecological models of the mind – especially the 
studies of Andy Clark and David Chalmers, but also Gregory Bateson 
and, more recently, Alva Noë – offer a variety of tools, devices and 
frameworks, such as the notion of “sensorimotor contingencies” or 
the claim that “we are already at home in the environment. We are 
out of our heads” (Noë 2009: 8) – the “body”, which is at the core of 
the model of the embodied mind, seems in no need of definition 
whatsoever. 
New theories have modified the notions of both mind and envi-
ronment without ever discussing the body or changing its scheme, as 
if the latter were a universal principle, something given a priori with a 
hypostatized form. 
Thus, we have successfully overcome the doctrine of intellectus 
archetypus, but not the premise of a corpus archetypum, the body on 
which that particular kind of intellect is based. 
What is the sense or purpose of postulating an embodied mind if 
the notion of the body itself does not evolve and keeps asserting the 
separation between body and world, and the superiority of the for-
mer over the latter? The present article has three objectives: 1) to 
shed light on the notion of the body in Embodiment theory; 2) to find 
Weltanshauungen that are more effective in validating and justifying 
the corporeal dimension of cognition; 3) to develop a reflection on 
the role of perspectivism in the sensorimotor processes. 
 
 
1. A corpus archetypum 
 
At least since Polykleitos’ Canon, Western culture has been dominat-
ed by a classical perspective on the body – anthropomorphic, univo-
cal and serving as the “Nullpunkt of all the dimensions of the world” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968: 249). 
This linear perspective has been demonstrated by more than half 
a century of art history, with its rules of representing the space 
through vertical and singular vanishing points. In philosophy, this par-
ticular way of thinking about the body indicates the status of subjec-
tivity. Admittedly, 20th century aesthetics and semiotics did decon-
struct the idea of the body as an enclosed and impervious referential-
ity, prior to sense, and insisted on aesthesia, including its non-codi-
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fied and non-codifiable expressions, as the medium whereby the 
flesh and skin of corporeality, viewing and visible, partake in the 
world (see Fontanille 2004). However, the scenario remains that of a 
subject with a purpose and grasp on objects, with Retention and Pro-
tention: the subject of Husserl’s intentional act. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s bold Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? (1994) 
challenged the predominance of the body over the world: “The being 
of sensation is not the flesh but the compound of nonhuman forces 
of the cosmos, of man’s nonhuman becomings, and of the ambiguous 
house that exchanges and adjusts them” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 
184). The way was paved by one of Deleuze’s main references, Henri 
Maldiney, who considered perception as an “articulation within the 
phenomenon” and as “a foundation constituted by a series of totali-
ties articulated into meaning – the closing of a level crossing, evening 
coming down on the fields, a light twinkling in the dark, the inade-
quacy of a key in a keyhole or of a dress in a given season” (Maldiney 
1973: 43-5, tr. mine). Nonetheless, throughout modernity, the body 
has remained the touchstone for any kind of representation, “the 
mold […] of any housing model” (Vitta 2008: 15, tr. mine), although it 
was rejected by contemporary architecture and art in favor of a re-
turn to the megalithic (see Migliore 2016). 
A challenging enterprise such as the application of Embodiment 
theory to the Humanities and to the Social Sciences cannot be limited 
to a univocal vision of the body. The model of the body underlying 
Embodiment theory is inadequate and outdated with respect to the 
theory that it is supposed to support. As a consequence, the main 
theorists of the “Embodied Mind” struggle to explain how the mind is 
actually embodied and why neurons are not a sufficient explanation: 
 
Every living being categorizes. Even the amoeba categorizes the things it en-
counters into food or nonfood, what it moves toward or moves away from. 
The amoeba cannot choose whether to categorize; it just does. The same is 
true at every level of the animal world. Animals categorize food, predators, 
possible mates, members of their own species, and so on. How animals cate-
gorize depends upon their sensing apparatus and their ability to move them-
selves and to manipulate objects. Categorization is therefore a consequence 
of how we are embodied. We have evolved to categorize; if we hadn’t, we 
would not have survived. Categorization is, for the most part, not a product 
of conscious reasoning. We categorize as we do because we have the brains 
and bodies we have and because we interact in the world the way we do. 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 17-8) 
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Lakoff and Johnson do not clarify the kind of body and mind to 
which they are referring. The hypothesis of a mind incarnated in a 
body has, in their view, no repercussion on the concepts of “body” 
and “mind”, which remain a priori: indeed, irrespective of Embodi-
ment theory, “we have the brains and bodies we have” (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999: 17-8). The authors then return to the role of neurons 
and synaptic connections, since, in their view, “a small percentage of 
our categories have been formed by conscious acts of categorization, 
but most are formed automatically and unconsciously as a result of 
functioning in the world”, so that “we do not, and cannot, have full 
conscious control over how we categorize” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 
18). And below: 
 
Think of the properties of the human body that contribute to the peculiari-
ties of our conceptual system. We have eyes and ears, arms and legs that 
work in certain very definite ways and not in others. We have a visual sys-
tem, with topographic maps and orientation-sensitive cells that provides 
structure for our ability to conceptualize spatial relations. Our abilities to 
move in the ways we do and to track the motion of other things give motion 
a major role in our conceptual system. The fact that we have muscles and 
use them to apply force in certain ways leads to the structure of our system 
of causal concepts. What is important is not just that we have bodies and 
that thought is somehow embodied. What is important is that the peculiar 
nature of our bodies shapes our very possibilities for conceptualization and 
categorization (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 18-9, italics mine). 
 
This entire paragraph from Philosophy in the flesh (1999) consid-
ers the body as a given which Lakoff and Johnson avoid addressing. 
The authors are never specific when thematizing the presence of the 
body, and their whole argument therefore remains quite vague. A 
truly effective Embodiment theory would require a version of corpo-
reality that is less centered on the Self and more complex than the 
one that has so far dominated Western philosophy: a version which 
could retroactively influence the Western philosophy of the body and 
which could and should help us rethink our Western conceptions of 
body and mind. 
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2. Bodies and souls in new anthropology 
 
When elaborating the notion of Embodiment, philosophy and cogni-
tive sciences should have interfaced more with anthropology. Over 
the past thirty years, i.e. parallel to the development of Embodiment 
theories, anthropology has gone through the so-called “ontological 
turn”. The pivotal studies, most of which were conducted in Latin 
America, called for the abandonment of ontological monism (based 
on the idea of a single being endowed with a single truth); for the 
abandonment of the idea that all entities share an identical nature; 
and for the existence of different cosmovisions with different values 
and modes of knowledge. As accurately noted by Bruno Latour, this 
does not mean equalizing mononaturalism with monoculturalism and 
claiming that “the one world is ours, the many worlds are yours; and 
if your disputes are too noisy, may the world of harsh reality come in 
to pacify your disputes” (Latour 2002: 16). The idea is rather to 
acknowledge the existence of different ways to identify and engage 
with the continuities and discontinuities we experience. The protago-
nists of this “ontological turn” include Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, 
Marilyn Strathern, Bruno Latour, and Philippe Descola. 
In particular, Descola’s (2013) classification of cosmologies into 
animistic/totemic/naturalist/analogical, derived from Viveiros de Cas-
tro, frees us from our exclusive bond with Western naturalism, i.e. 
from the thesis of the original Subject from whom everything is de-
rived, and postulates the coexistence of multiple natures. According 
to Descola, animism implies inner resemblance and physical differ-
ence; totemism, inner and physical resemblance; naturalism, inner 
difference and physical resemblance; analogism, inner and physical 
difference. 
 
 
2.1. The animistic mentality 
 
In order to rethink the relationship between corporeality and cogni-
tion in Embodiment, we must consider the animistic mentality, which 
is founded on inner continuity – a whole soul, hence the animistic be-
lief in transmigration – and physical discontinuity – our bodies distin-
guish us. Descola maintains a naturalist perspective to explain the 
four cosmologies – as can be seen in the exhibition he curated at 
Quai Branly, La fabrique des images (see Descola 2010). The French 
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anthropologist limits animism to the Amazonian and Amerindian 
populations he studies, as if, all things considered, the West were al-
ien to these mentalities and could only identify with them on an ab-
stract level. 
In this light the merit of Brazilian anthropologist Viveiros de Castro 
was to demonstrate that the mechanisms and identification modes of 
animism are not limited to the practices of native populations. Ani-
mistic logic, whereby body and soul are effects of perspective and 
never a priori categories, is extremely widespread in wartime and in 
the animal world, and especially in the fight for survival (see Migliore 
2008, Fabbri 2008, 2011). It is also rampant in Western society, and 
not for religious reasons or because Buddhism is currently in fashion. 
Let us think of the controversy about eating meat. The main charge 
brought forward by vegans is that, by ingesting the flesh of animals, 
meat eaters also ingest the soul that these animals have in common 
with us. The argument of the defense is that, deep down, we are all 
cannibals, as humans always eat an alterity which they reduce to 
themselves through a variety of beliefs and rituals (see Lévi-Strauss 
2013). The first argument originates from the belief that animals in-
corporate a soul that we share, i.e. that their body, being “an assem-
blage of affects or ways of being that constitute a habitus” (Viveiros 
de Castro 1998: 478), incorporates a reflexive form that is equivalent 
to ours; the second argument, which is analogic, is ruled by a basic 
“exterior/interior” difference between humans and animals, animals 
that humans reduce to their own life form. Only a “theory of the sign 
and communication” (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 35), i.e. semiotics, can 
describe and explain these ever-topical social controversies. 
 
 
2.2. Embodied knowledge: sensoriality, “dividuality”, perspectival ob-
jectification  
 
What is animism? A recent two-volume anthology addresses this top-
ic (Consigliere 2014a, 2014b). Animism is a way of thinking that truly 
locates knowledge inside the body, in the sense that affections, af-
fects, and habitus are rooted in corporeality to the point of determin-
ing the somatic shape and transforming it in time:  
 
A wise man, huni unaya, has knowledge throughout his whole body. “Hawen 
yuda dasibi unaia, his whole body knows”, they say. When I asked him where 
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specifically a wise man had knowledge, they listed his skin, his hands, his 
ears, his genitals, his liver, and his eyes. “Does his brain have knowledge?”, I 
asked. “Hamaki (it doesn’t)”, they responded. (Kensinger 1995: 239) 
 
For the Cashinahua people of Peru, knowledge does not reside in 
the brain because there is no physical experience that specifically in-
volves the brain, as opposed to the skin, hands, ears, genitals, liver 
and eyes. Each of these organs is associated with a process of 
knowledge acquisition and application through physical actions.  
Knowledge and body are so closely interconnected that disorders 
of the former can have catastrophic consequences on the latter. 
Once again, this is also the case in the West. Take for instance the 
perception system of a hunter, tuning in and gathering relevant in-
formation to guide his or her behavior: the knowledge of the skin, the 
sensorial experience attached to the skin, tells him or her the position 
and behavior of the animals in the forest. Here is a true “embodi-
ment”, a “body that knows” (see McCallum 1996) through its specific 
properties, which are sensitive. Rather than presenting a generic 
body that incarnates a generic mind, any Embodiment theory should 
aim to investigate and to discover these knowledge-inducing sensory 
dynamics. 
The kind of Embodiment addressed in the above-mentioned an-
thropological studies therefore differs from the Embodiment of cog-
nitive sciences, insofar as the former originates from a played and 
enacted empirical corporeality: it does not show that the mind is em-
bodied, but how it is embodied. 
The second difference is that, according to anthropological Em-
bodiment, the body is anything but unique. Descola’s (2013) theory 
on the different modes of identification – animism, totemism, natu-
ralism, and analogism – is constitutively interactantial, i.e. it relies on 
the similarity and/or difference among souls and among bodies. 
Moreover, the field of animism ignores individuality and is based on 
“dividuality”, that is on a person’s composite nature, the result of the 
“absorption of heterogeneous influences” (Marriott 1976: 111), the 
embodiment of manifold relations – human and non-human entities, 
material and non-material substances – which partake in various 
ways in the constitution of that person (see Strathern and Lambek 
1998). The body therefore becomes the object of intense semiotic 
scrutiny in the definition of personal identities and in the circulation 
of social values (see Turner 1995). 
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Finally, the third difference with the Embodiment of cognitive sci-
ences is that, in Anthropological Embodiment, the body can be per-
ceived only from the outside, through the eye of the other. To use a 
metaphor borrowed from cognitive linguistics, the body emerges 
when it is the target and not the source of observation. 
 
 
3. Perspectivism 
 
According to animism, bodies are the result of perspectival effects: 
the soul, which remains identical across the species, adopts a view-
point; the body, which varies from one individual to the next, being a 
system of habitus, affections and affects, becomes manifest when it 
becomes the object of someone else’s viewpoint. This kind of “per-
spectivism”, observed and theorized for the first time by anthropolo-
gist Tânia Stolze Lima, who studied the Juruna of Brazil, is different 
from relativism, which admits various points of view on a single reali-
ty (see Lima 1996). There are no object-creating Subjects, but rather 
anything that occupies a given point of view will become a subject 
(see Viveiros de Castro 1998). There is no body in the sense of an a 
priori physiological essence and no undefined cognition embodied in 
it, but a constellation of attitudes and habits that emerge in the form 
of points of view – that is to say, differences – and which determine 
the unique character of the body of a given species: what it eats, how 
it communicates, where it lives, whether it is gregarious or solitary, 
etc. 
Like Viveiros de Castro and later Descola, Lima also draws on 
Deleuze’s reading of perspectivism as the “truth of relativity” and not 
the “relativity of what is true”: in a non-essentialist and phenomeni-
cal worldview, the subject is an event: a vector of curvature, the ef-
fect of what occupies the point of view and makes it what it is, “pure 
powers whose act consists in habitus or arrangements (folds) in the 
soul” (Deleuze 2006: 24)2. 
                                                 
2 The authors mentioned by Deleuze, in particular Leibniz and Nietzsche, never 
imagine a situation in which the visions change but reality remains the same. In 
Leibniz, however, the multiplicity of perspectives – as things and beings are 
points of view – converges into God, the monadic and geometric point of con-
vergence of all points of view (Serres 1968: 252). In Nietzsche, to the contrary, 
the point of view opens on a divergence, which claims that “each point of view is 
another town, the towns are linked only by their distance and resonate only 
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Even the idea of the animistic soul and cognition as a concatena-
tion of affects, affections and habitus comes from Deleuze, as proof 
that the generalizing power of this kind of Embodiment goes well be-
yond animistic cultures and concerns both the individual and other 
living species: the “affect” is the acting power that increases or de-
creases according to the chance encounters in which the sentient 
body takes part; the “affection” is a composition of bodies, a relation-
ship of mutual capture that triggers the alterations imposed by a 
body to another (see Deleuze 2013). Here Deleuze is referring to Spi-
noza, who defined the affectus as “the modifications of the body, 
whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished, 
aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications” (Spi-
noza 1951: 4). Ethology itself, according to Deleuze, is based on the 
affects of which we are capable and which define the bodies: 
 
The approach is no less valid for us, for human beings, than for animals, be-
cause no one knows ahead of time the affects one is capable of; it is a long 
affair of experimentation, requiring a lasting prudence, a Spinozan wisdom 
that implies the construction of a plane of immanence or consistency. Spino-
za’s ethics has nothing to do with orality; he conceives it as an ethology, that 
is, a composition of fast and slow speeds, of capacities for affecting and be-
ing affected on this plane of immanence. (Deleuze 1988: 125) 
 
The animistic model of the soul is human, while that of the body is 
animal. This condition shared by humans and animals is not animality, 
but humanity.  
Thus, jaguars and humans are both predators from the point of 
view of a lamb; jaguars are predators and lambs are prey from the 
point of view of a human; and humans and lambs are both prey from 
the point of view of a jaguar (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 470). Culture is 
the point of view of the Self on the Self – a “deictic us” whereby sub-
jects experience and agree on their own nature; nature is the point of 
view of the Self on the bodies-affections of others, the shape of the 
Other as body – a “scopic function”. Crazed by hunger, Alex, the lion 
of the animation movie Madagascar 1 (2005), sees his zebra friend as 
a steak.  
                                                                                                   
through the divergence of their series, their houses, and their streets […]. Dis-
junction is no longer a means of separation. Incompossibility is now a means of 
communication” (Deleuze 1990: 173-4). For a comparison between the notion of 
perspective in semiotics and philosophy, see Migliore 2015. 
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3.1. The morphology of vision 
 
We can clearly understand that this kind of embodiment, which is in-
separable from perspectivism, radically changes our idea of “vision”, 
of how we see others and perceive ourselves. Perspectivism is differ-
ent from relativism, which postulates various points of view on a sin-
gle reality. And it is not a matter of ideological representation or pro-
jection, unlike Western perspective. Here, the nature of the observed 
object changes depending on the vision. Let us now get to the heart 
of the matter. 
The nature of what is observed is at the core of “primary dialectics 
[…] between seeing and eating” (Mentore 1993: 29) or, in any case, 
of a complex interaction between seeing and being seen. Jaguars see 
blood as we do beer (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 470); what we see as a 
mud puddle is, to a tapir, a large ceremonial house. “What varies is 
the objective correlative of the point of view: what passes through 
the optic nerve (or digestive tube) of each species, so to speak” 
(Viveiros de Castro 2012: 34, italics mine). There are no self-identical 
substances that are being categorized in different ways, but relational 
multiplicities such as blood-beer or zebra-steak. This approach has 
three main consequences: 
1) scopic functions are non-simultaneous. A human and a jaguar can-
not be both “subjects”, or rather “people”, at the same time. A jaguar 
pouncing on a man sees the latter’s blood as beer before the man has 
become aware of the peril. “Each species has to be capable of not 
losing sight, so to speak, of the fact that the others see themselves as 
people and, simultaneously, capable of forgetting this fact – that is, of 
– no longer seeing it” (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 34). This is particularly 
important when humans become predators, that is to say when they 
kill to eat. They must be the first to see so as not to be seen.  
2) Although we must be capable of “not seeing” the animals we eat 
as they see themselves, sometimes it may be useful or even neces-
sary to see how certain animals see and to see them as they are seen 
by other animals (see Viveiros de Castro 2012). The Self incorporates 
the point of view of the enemy. In order to avoid being eaten by the 
jaguar, we must adopt its point of view on itself, become the Other 
by occupying the enemy’s position toward us, but without letting us 
be overwhelmed by alterity. This is how René Thom explains the evo-
lution of the species and how morphological mutations unfold 
through time. He goes so far as suggesting that the shape of the prey 
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may be based on that of the predator’s claws or beak. Skin and shell 
are tactical interruptions of the prey’s organic extension and counter 
the obstructive action of the predator’s beak, fangs or claws (Thom 
1988: 139). According to Viveiros de Castro, it is the fact of living on 
the edge between fear and desire of the Other that induces the in-
corporation of, by and through the Other (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 
29). The dynamics of animistic Embodiment are based on a different 
paradigm than ours. In the Western philosophical tradition, the pro-
totypical manifestation of the Other is that of the friend – a friend 
who ultimately is Other as a different “moment” of the Self; in Amer-
indian culture, it is the foe who functions as the experienced tran-
scendental condition. “Humans have to be capable of deconditioning 
their humanity in certain conditions, since the influx of the non-
human and becoming-other-than-human are obligatory moments of 
a fully human condition. The world of immanent humanity is also 
(and for the same reasons) a world of the immanence of the enemy” 
(Viveiros de Castro 2012: 32). Here “enmity is not a mere privative 
complement of ‘amity’, a simple negative facticity, but a de jure struc-
ture of thought, a positivity in its own right” (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 
40). 
3) Thus, the visible form of the body, which is a powerful sign of the 
differences between affections, is not a fixed entity but a variable and 
metamorphic appearance, an ever-changing and removable clothing. 
It can be deceptive: a human form may conceal a jaguar-affection. 
Appearances are misleading, not because they differ in their sup-
posed essence, but precisely because they are appearances, i.e. 
something that appears. An appearance implies and is determined by 
a recipient, a subject in front of whom the act of appearing takes 
place. “It is not so much the body that is a clothing but rather that 
clothing is a body” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 482). Thus, it is not 
among the natives, but in the works of the Middle-European artist 
Alberto Savinio, a reader of Weininger, that we find human stages 
with heaps of animal-like toys or object-like moving toys (see for in-
stance his paintings Le fantôme de l’Opéra, 1929, and Les collégiens, 
1929). Savinio is thinking in terms of the appearance of objects. 
The considerations on Embodiment developed in anthropology 
and animal studies appear far richer and better articulated than the 
ones provided so far by psycholinguistics and cognitive linguistics, 
which help us describe and better understand languages but not the 
actual implication of the body in the process. 
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4. Embodiment and enunciation 
 
According to Viveiros de Castro, the apparatus of enunciation, that is 
the system of actorial, spatial and temporal deictics (see Benveniste 
1973a, 1973b) used for the analysis of objective and subjective mark-
ers in discourse, is the best possible model to study these processes. 
The Amerindian terms that are usually translated as “human being” 
do not actually refer to the natural category of the human species or 
to a member thereof, but to a person, an animated being in the pro-
nominal sense – be it a human, a jaguar or a lamb – as a relational 
position (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 483), the marker of a presence.  
Supposedly “human” characteristic are not the prerogative of 
humans. They are produced within the body. Individuals – as men-
tioned above – perceive the members of their own species as human-
ity, as culture. The species possesses a deictic “us” and, within the 
group, humanity is a reflexive property – the lamb is human to an-
other lamb, and the jaguar is human to another jaguar. Contrariwise, 
identity, i.e. the difference among bodies that can only be perceived 
from an external point of view, is the product of a scopic function. 
The impersonal pronouns “it” and “them” indicate the non-person or 
the object, i.e. nature (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 483) Then there is the 
“you”, the second person (singular or plural) seen as the other sub-
ject of a non-human perspective, the supernatural, a dead persona or 
spirit. “Only shamans, multinatural beings by definition and office, are 
always capable of transiting the various perspectives, calling and be-
ing called ‘you’ by [non-human subjects] without losing their condi-
tion as human subjects” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 483).  
In rituals, these pronominal functions are inverted. Human bodies, 
covered in feathers, colors, patterns, masks and other animal pros-
theses, are transformed into animals and reveal to their own eyes the 
“natural” peculiarity of their body. Interestingly enough, the moment 
of the maximum social objectification of bodies coincides with the 
moment of maximum animalization (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 480).  
 
 
4.1. Embodiment as incorporation and ensoulment of the alterity 
 
The construction of the pronominal person is a fascinating topic (see 
Santos-Granero 2012). In animistic cosmology, the notion that an in-
dividual embodies his or her own cognition makes no sense: generally 
Tiziana Migliore, Embodiment theories and alternative perspectives on the body 
 
 129 
speaking, corporeality and thought are already interconnected, and 
the function of the organs is to give a transitive property to the re-
flexivity of the soul. But above all, this soul and this body are the re-
sult – temporary and ever-changing – of the incorporation of extra-
neous substances, in order to transfer some of their powers and qual-
ities onto the person being made. In animism, such incorporation is 
realized through two modalities: embodiment, which entails the in-
corporation through objectivation of external substances and subjec-
tivities, and ensoulment, which involves the incorporation through 
subjectivation of external artifacts and bodily substances. Instances of 
embodiment include, among the Yanesha, the ingestion of the sub-
jectivity of the liana eñsesrech, which can be turned into hard straight 
bones, while ensoulment include the incorporation of personal or-
naments (chest bands and wristbands), clothes (tunics), and tools 
(spindles and bows), and their gradual transmutation into somatic or 
extrasomatic body parts (Santos-Granero 2012: 198). This new eth-
nography no longer ascribes the transfer “contagious magic” caused 
by similarities and contact (see Frazer 1915), but interprets it by tak-
ing into account the instances at stake. 
In this approach, every person is unique but never complete, in-
dependent or “self-contained”, because it is a being constituted by 
the subjectival substances of multiple entities, and a being constitu-
tive of other persons (Santos-Granero 2012: 200).  
 
 
5. Embodiment definition categories 
 
Viveiros de Castro has been criticized for using “Western” categories 
to explain non-Western ways of existence. Such a critique is mispla-
ced. His model of the four cosmologies (naturalist-analogist-animistic-
totemic) implies the existence and value of natures and mentalities 
that are present in the West but alternative to naturalism. Hence his 
methodological use of the body/soul category to make explicit the re-
lationship determining each of these cosmologies, namely the rela-
tionship between “inside” and “outside”, however they are defined 
and correlated across different cultures. For instance, as it turns out, 
the “interior/exterior” pair is not necessarily discontinuous and bina-
ry: the two terms can both be immanent (as opposed to an immanent 
body and a transcendent soul) and their connotations can be local. 
Moreover, the body/soul pair generally never refers to a single being 
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but to the relationship of similarity and/or difference among bodies 
and among souls. Let us repeat it once more: naturalism implies inner 
difference and physical resemblance; analogism, inner and physical 
difference; animism implies inner resemblance and physical differ-
ence; totemism, inner and physical resemblance. To all intents and 
purposes, Embodiment requires the interdefinition between inside 
and outside and consists in the variety of modes of this interdefinition. 
Supposing that these modes have a geographic distribution would 
be a return to the fallacy of cultural divisions and hierarchies. It is a 
matter of thought and belief, not of distinction between West and non-
West. 1) The animistic thought is and has always been part of our 
world, just as there may be elements of naturalism in Amazonian cul-
tures; and 2) Deleuze, despite being a Western philosopher, was not 
necessarily a naturalist philosopher. The critique to Viveiros de Castro is 
therefore based on a wrong premise, namely on the assumption that 
these mentalities are and can be separated and physically located in 
different worlds. 
The meaning of “Embodiment” in new Anthropology sheds light 
on the shortcomings of the cognitivist approach. Considering the re-
cent change of sensitivity toward the non-human and the animal, the 
notion of Embodiment as an individual mind incarnated in an individ-
ual body must be abandoned. 
Embodiment should rather be seen as a temporary clothing, as a 
somatic exteriorization, interconnected with the viewpoints of oth-
ers, of an interior system of habits, of affections and affects. This is 
the key to understanding, in everyday life, the contiguity between an-
imistic, naturalist, analogist and totemic behaviors. 
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